The English Revenue of Richard I
Author(s): Nick Barratt
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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

The English Revenue of Richard I

HISTORIANS tracing the demise of the 'Angevin empire' have traditionally focused on the reign of King John for explanations, placing the twin disasters of the loss of Normandy in 1204 and the restrictions on Angevin kingship in England in 1215 firmly at his feet. Recent work into the financial background to these events has uncovered direct links between specific clauses in Magna Carta and John's attempts to raise revenue from domestic sources,[1] and a reassessment of the comparative revenue available to John and Philip Augustus suggests that neither side enjoyed a significant advantage on the eve of war in 1202–3,[2] making it easier to argue that in political and military terms John was the architect of his own misfortune. Yet the recent treatment of John's revenues has been made without reference to the unprecedented financial activity that occurred in the reign of his predecessor, Richard I.[3] In the 1920s Sir James Ramsay made a rudimentary attempt to link finance with political events, but doubt has been cast on the accuracy of his work.[4] This paper provides the first complete investigation into the impact of the Third Crusade, Richard's subsequent ransom and the resumption of war with Philip Augustus on English state finance in the crucial decade before the loss of Normandy.

The primary aim of this paper is to present a full analysis of Richard's revenue from England, detailing its size and the sources from which it was derived. The main sources of information are the Exchequer pipe rolls from England which exist for Richard's entire reign, complemented by two surviving rolls from Normandy for 1195 and 1198. John Gillingham has suggested that any figures calculated from these 'official' records of audit will be far smaller than the amounts actually received.[5] This statement has some validity. Under the Angevins the Chamber became the focal point of income and expenditure, receiving and dispersing revenue on an *ad hoc* basis as the king moved from territory to territory. This practical development was necessary to cope with the

1. Most recently in N. Barratt, 'The Revenue of King John', *ante,* cxi (1996), 835–55. See also J. C. Holt, *Magna Carta* (2nd edition, London 1992) and id. *The Northerners* (Oxford 1961), in particular pp. 143–74

2. N Barratt, 'The Revenues of John and Philip Augustus revisited', in S. D. Church (ed.), *King John: New Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 75–99.

3. For a cursory discussion, see R.V. Turner, 'Good or Bad Kingship? The Case of Richard the Lionheart' in *Haskins Society Journal,* 8 (1996), 73–8.

4. James H. Ramsey, *A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England 1066–1399* (2 vols, Oxford 1925), i. 197–227. For a discussion of the merits and demerits of Ramsay's work, see Barratt, 'Revenue', 836 n. 3.

5. J. Gillingham, *Richard Coeur de Lion* (London, 1994) pp. 43–5 and 51–4.

strains of administering the vast network of lands with their separate financial systems and currencies. Through surviving English documents, most notably Wardrobe rolls from the early thirteenth century and oblique references to Chamber rolls in the pipe rolls, we know that records of these transactions were originally kept, but the relevant documents for the 1190s are missing. However, Richard was absent from England for most of his reign, and therefore the problem of missing English revenue paid directly to him or the Chamber is largely eradicated.[1] In any case by the late twelfth century the relevant bodies of audit for the Angevin domains – in particular the English and Norman Exchequers – were playing an increasingly important role in maintaining the cohesion of the empire.[2] Periods of prolonged absence by the Angevins from their respective seats of government actually increased the development of formal procedures for payment, audit and record-keeping under their appointed deputies. When such payments were made to the English Chamber, or revenue was sent to the king overseas, an entry usually found its way on to the pipe rolls so that the accountant could prove he was quit of the debt.

Other drawbacks associated with counting pipe rolls are familiar,[3] and fiscal historians generally agree that the main difficulties – that the rolls are records of audit rather than receipt, that they may omit data, and do not cover one uniform chronological period – do not seriously detract from the value of using them to obtain a general picture of annual revenue. Nevertheless, the type of revenue recorded on the pipe rolls requires careful definition. In general, two distinct categories can be identified. 'Cash' refers to money paid into the Exchequer, the Chamber or to the king, and equates to 'disposable income'. 'Credit' revenue is defined as expenditure ordered by the king and allowed against an accountant's debt, which obviated the necessity for collecting the money centrally and reissuing it for expenditure. In effect, this revenue has already been disposed of, but still represents a contribution to the overall level of annual revenue enjoyed by the Crown. Excluded from this category are fixed alms and *terrae datae* entries, in particular relating to county farm accounts, and pardons. It has not been standard practice amongst financial historians to exclude these entries on the grounds that they had a political value[4], but in purely fiscal terms they do not represent either disposable or expended revenue.

Figures for Richard's revenue from England have been set out in Tables 1–3. Table 1 presents global revenue based on known pipe roll totals and estimated income from the 1198 carucage, and includes data

1. H. G Richardson and G. O. Sayles, *The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta* (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 232.
2. Gillingham has also commented on the adoption of English and Norman practices in other parts of the empire, for example *Coeur de Lion* pp. 51–2, 57–8 and 63–5.
3. Barratt, 'Revenue', 836–7.
4. For a discussion see Barratt, 'Revenue', 840–2.

Table 1. *Global Revenue Totals (cash and credit, pipe rolls and miscellaneous sources)*

Year	Pipe roll	Estimated	Event	Total	Other financial events
1188	21,233			21,233	Saladin tithe
1189	14,978			14,978	
1190	31,089			31,089	
1191	12,418			12,418	
1192	9,857			9,857	
1193	10,506			10,506	Ransom – series of taxes including Fourth
1194	25,292			25,292	Ransom – Carucage
1195	25,082			25,082	
1196	28,323			28,323	
1197	20,775			20,775	
1198	25,405	1,000	Carucage	26,405	
1199	22,183			22,183	
1200	23,492	3,000	Carucage	26,492	
1201	23,661			23,661	
1202	23,238			23,238	
1203	25,628	15,000	Seventh	40,628	

Average Annual Revenue Totals (pipe rolls only)

Period	Average
1189–93 (exc. 1190)	11,940
1189–93 (inc. 1190)	15,770
1194–8	24,975
1199–1203	23,640

for 1188 and 1199–1203 to provide context. Levels of average annual revenue from the pipe rolls alone have also been provided for the periods 1189–93, 1194–8 and 1199–1203. Money received from the Saladin Tithe and the taxes that contributed to Richard's ransom have been excluded from this table. Virtually nothing is known about the yield of these taxes because they were collected and audited by separate bodies whose records do not survive. Table 2 provides an analysis of pipe roll revenue only, cash and credit, identifying five contributory sources to the annual totals. The first category entitled 'County' can be used to assess Richard's ordinary income from the shrieval county accounts, in effect the backbone of English state finance. 'Escheated honours' represents incidental revenue from forfeited or escheated baronial honours held by the crown. This has been separated from 'County Escheats', which are

Table 2. *Source of Pipe Roll Revenue (cash and credit, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Pipe roll total	County total	% of total	Escheated honours total	% of total	County escheat total	% of total	Other lay total	% of total	Clerical total	% of total
1189	14,978	11,363	75.9	1,919	12.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	1,695	11.3
1190	31,089	28,014	90.1	216	0.7	582	1.9	2,277	7.3	0	0.0
1191	12,418	11,603	93.4	515	4.1	0	0.0	300	2.4	0	0.0
1192	9,857	9,613	97.5	81	0.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	163	1.7
1193	10,506	8,997	85.6	819	7.8	0	0.0	691	6.6	0	0.0
1194	25,292	20,006	79.1	1,694	6.7	2,228	8.8	12	0.0	1,352	5.3
1195	25,082	20,145	80.3	1,254	5.0	2,403	9.6	489	1.9	790	3.2
1196	28,323	18,358	64.8	1,016	3.6	1,946	6.9	1,991	7.0	5,012	17.7
1197	20,775	18,061	86.9	705	3.4	457	2.2	1,079	5.2	474	2.3
1198	25,405	22,702	89.4	293	1.2	0	0.0	2,623	10.3	0	0.0

Table 3. *Composition of Pipe Roll Revenue (entire totals, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Pipe roll total	Cash total	% of total	Credit total	% of total
1188	21,233	19,740	93.0	1,494	7.0
1189	14,978	12,934	86.4	2,044	13.6
1190	31,089	26,291	84.6	4,797	15.4
1191	12,418	8,426	67.9	3,992	32.1
1192	9,857	8,166	82.8	1,691	17.2
1193	10,506	5,821	55.4	4,685	44.6
1194	25,292	23,481	92.8	1,811	7.2
1195	25,082	23,546	93.9	1,535	6.1
1196	28,323	26,163	92.4	2,161	7.6
1197	20,775	19,972	96.1	803	3.9
1198	25,405	23,119	91.0	2,286	9.0
1199	22,183	20,515	92.5	1,668	7.5
1200	23,492	21,130	90.9	2,362	10.1
1201	23,661	21,717	91.8	1,944	8.2
1202	23,238	20,209	87.0	3,029	13.0
1203	25,628	23,167	90.4	2,461	9.6

Average Levels of Disposable Income (entire totals, pipe rolls only)

Period	Average (% of total)
1189–93	75.4
1194–8	93.2
1199–1203	90.5

accounts of royal escheators placed in charge of land that was normally under shrieval control, an experimental attempt to increase the revenue yield in 1190 and 1194–7. Miscellaneous 'Other Lay' sources are listed, such as accounts of the exchanges and profits from the mines, and 'Clerical' possessions in the king's hands through vacancy are also presented separately to indicate revenue from regalian rights. Finally, Table 3 details the composition of pipe roll revenue in terms of cash and credit, providing an indication of Richard's ordinary disposable revenue.

Turning first to Table 1, a clear pattern emerges. It is immediately apparent that Richard's reign falls into two halves, divided by the king's return to England from captivity in 1194. If the 1190 total is momentarily set aside, revenue before 1194 never exceeded £15,000, and the annual average for the period 1189–93 was only £11,940. The total of £31,089 for 1190 requires additional comment. Throughout his entire reign John only managed to raise an equivalent sum, without the aid of Interdict revenue or extraordinary taxation, on one occasion.[1] However, this figure can be explained by placing it in the context of the financial preparations for the crusade. Extraordinary taxation in the form of the 1188 Saladin tithe was originally requested by Henry II at Le Mans and scheduled for collection early in 1189, but because he died the majority of revenue was received by Richard. As the *compotus de decimis* has not survived, there is considerable debate over the amount of revenue actually levied. Gervase of Canterbury states £60,000 was taken from the English and a further £70,000 from the Jews[2], which is clearly an exaggeration. Round suggests that £6,000 was collected.[3] Regardless of the exact sum the taxation affected normal state finance, as the pipe roll total for 1189 (£14,978) remains relatively low compared to 1188 (£21,233). The total for 1190 therefore reflected a final attempt to extract revenue for the crusade from the traditional sources at Richard's disposal, in particular the levying of fines for the renewal of charters and imposing exorbitant feudal dues to exploit his accession.

After Richard's departure, the level of annual revenue dropped dramatically, even below that seen in 1189. Three contributory factors were clearly at work during the king's absence. First, the poor health of royal income can be partly explained by the political problems experienced by the regency government, culminating in John's rebellion. It is surely no coincidence that at the height of the disturbances in 1192–3, income audited by the Exchequer had slumped to a mere £10,000 per annum. Parallels can be drawn with the situation in 1215, when civil war severely disrupted revenue collection and audit at the Exchequer.[4] However, the situation in 1192–3 was slightly different. For a start, the potential for raising revenue had been diminished by the removal of entire counties, namely Somerset, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and the Honour of Lancaster, which can be treated to all intents and purposes as another county, from Exchequer control as part of Richard's settlement on John. The establishment of an unofficial second power base in England diverted revenue away from the Exchequer, as normal lines of income that the king would expect to enjoy – the county and borough farms, patronage, profits of justice and other favours normally granted by the crown – were collected directly by John in these territories.

Secondly, although financial administration in England had been adapted by successive regimes to cope with an increasingly non-resident monarch, the complete removal of royal authority from the boundaries of the 'empire' clearly affected the government's requirement for money.

1. The 1205 pipe roll records revenue totalling £31,541. Barratt, 'Revenue', Table 3, 841.
2. M. Jurkowski, C. L. Smith and D. Crook, *Lay Taxes in England and Wales, 1188–1688* (P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice] Publications, 1998) p. 2
3. J. H. Round, 'The Saladin Tithe' *ante*, xxxi (1916), 447–50.
4. Barratt, 'Revenue', 843.

When Richard sailed overseas on Crusade, the normal lines of expenditure – warfare, diplomacy, maintaining a royal household – no longer applied with the same urgency. Instead, the primary function of the regime was to keep finance 'ticking over' until Richard's return, relying on income from 'traditional' resources such as the royal demesne, as opposed to revenue derived from royal authority, in particular the exploitation of feudal dues, sale of justice and patronage. This explanation certainly carries weight for the first part of Richard's absence, but once Philip Augustus returned from the Crusade and John broke into open rebellion, which coincided with the Welsh threat in 1193, there was great need to raise revenue to mount necessary opposition to the crisis. Table 3 clearly shows that revenue was expended locally to pay for soldiers' wages and military equipment, but it is also apparent that no additional income was raised to meet these crises – very little new material appears on the 1193 pipe roll, and the overall amount of cash collected decreased correspondingly to leave annual revenue at a similar level to 1192.

A final factor that influenced levels of 'ordinary' revenue was the debilitating effects of 'extraordinary' taxation introduced in 1193. To gather sufficient funds to pay for Richard's ransom, the government had been empowered to introduce a series of aids, carucages, scutages and tallages. The actual English contribution to the final ransom demand of 150,000 marks is unknown, as yet again no accounts survive. Nevertheless, an entry in the 1195 Norman pipe roll records the transfer of £5,732 to the Treasury at Caen, of which 6,000 marks were handed to the envoys of the Emperor,[1] and Richard's subsequent release suggests that sufficient cash was found. Yet it is clear from Table 2 that the counties did not contribute greatly compared with the revenue raised in preparations for the crusade in 1190 (£28,014) – the government was forced to rely on extraordinary taxation alone. It is unfortunate that few figures for Treasury reserves are available for the period. Large sums were drawn upon to pay for the fleet that sailed for the Holy Land in 1190, coupled with miscellaneous receipts and further drafts accumulated at the Tower of London.[2] No account for the Tower appeared in either 1191 or 1192, and receipts accumulated there in 1193 for payment of knights and armed serjeants in response to the dual crises contained no further drafts from reserves.[3] It is possible that Richard's departure drained the royal coffers, leaving the regency government short of ready cash, but without further data it is difficult to be certain.

After the King's return in 1194, a strikingly different picture emerges. Revenue never fell below £20,000 and averaged £24,975 between 1194–8.

1. T. Stapleton (ed.), *Magni Rotuli Scaccarii Normanniae sub Regibus Angliae*, 2 vols (London 1840–4), i p. 136, hereafter MRSN.
2. P[ipe] R[oll] 2 Richard I, pp. 1–4.
3. PR 5 Richard I, pp. 131–2.

This data makes interesting reading when compared with finances at the beginning of John's reign before the loss of Normandy. Richard's revenue exceeded that of his brother on virtually every count, underlined by the fact that John's average annual revenue for the period 1199–1203 was slightly lower at £23,640. The generation of new revenue in England from traditional sources coincided with a period of renewed warfare in Normandy as Richard fought to overturn the reverses suffered in his absence, and there is ample evidence from the 1198 Norman pipe roll of drafts of English treasure being used to support Norman defences.[1] Once again the re-establishment of royal authority behind the government in England is reflected in the vastly increased global revenue totals, and also, despite the onerous burden of the taxes of 1193–4 and the demands of continental warfare, in the further taxation demanded in the form of a carucage in 1198. Mitchell describes this carucage as a failure[2], as suggested by the conservative yield of £1,000; the tax generated a wave of fines for non-assessment and evasion which is recorded in the 1199 pipe roll.[3] Nevertheless, contemporary chroniclers held Richard responsible for the 'massive taxation' of his reign, commenting on his greed and by way of contrast favourably portraying the early years of his successor.[4] If the period 1194–1203 is viewed as a continuous sequence, the consistently high level of annual revenue would appear to support Holt's statement that 1194 marks an important watershed for John's reign,[5] and therefore requires further investigation.

Table 2 details the sources of revenue from which the pipe roll totals were accumulated. It is immediately clear that the majority of Richard's revenue was derived from the counties, supplemented by a regular, if somewhat low, level of income from escheated honours in royal hands and irregular contributions from other lay sources, such as the profits of the Exchange in 1198 and miscellaneous receipts connected with the crusade in 1190. Ecclesiastical revenue was an infrequent but potentially lucrative source, as demonstrated by the high yield from the Bishopric of Durham in 1196. However, it is the steady pressure on the counties to fund Richard's campaigns in Normandy after 1194 that is most apparent. Equally revealing about Richard's attitude to English state finance is an experiment begun in 1190 and resumed between 1194–7 on his return from captivity. To increase the revenue yield from escheated lands normally audited in the county accounts by the sheriff, special escheators were appointed who were empowered to account for all assets attached

1. For example the account of Geoffrey de Val-Richer includes a draft of 6,859 marks sterling that are partially spent on soldiers wages. Stapleton, *MRSN* ii, pp. xvi and 303.

2. S. K. Mitchell, *Studies in Taxation under John and Henry III* (New Haven, 1914), pp. 128–31.

3. PR 1 John, pp. xix–xx, 16, 19, 36, 58, 84, 98.

4. D. Carpenter, 'Abbot Ralph of Coggeshall's account of the last years of King Richard and the first years of King John' *ante,* cxiii (1998), 1210–30.

5. Holt, *Northerners*, in particular chapter IX 'The Loss of Normandy and its Consequences' pp. 143–74. Large annual revenue totals were not unusual, but tended to be isolated. It is the sustained nature of revenue collection in the period after 1194 that is therefore worthy of note.

to an escheat, not just for the nominal farm. It would appear that the experiment was a success, contributing between 7 and 10 per cent of the entire pipe roll total between 1194 and 1196. This is a clear attempt to raise as much revenue as possible to subsidize war against Philip.

These conclusions are amply supported by evidence in Table 3. The pipe roll revenue is presented in terms of disposable and non-disposable terms, respectively cash and credit. Once again, 1194 marks a clear turning point in Richard's reign. For the period 1189–93 the average annual proportion of cash revenue was 75 per cent, which rose dramatically to 93 per cent between 1194 and 1198. Before 1194, the government was struggling to raise disposable income, and the total of £5,892 for 1193 represents a virtual collapse in the flow of cash to the Treasury during John's revolt. The contrast with the steady flow of cash after 1194 is even more striking considering the amount of currency that clearly left England to pay for Richard's ransom. On average, the regime was receiving £23,000 each year in cash, a total that John failed to match until after the loss of Normandy.

It is therefore clear that after his release in 1194 Richard was able virtually to double his revenue from England overnight, and in a form that he could readily deploy wherever he chose. This achievement immediately raises two important questions: how was this achieved, and at what cost to the structure of English state finance? Tables 4 and 5 contain a breakdown of Richard's cash revenue from the shires, the traditional mainstay of royal revenue, as recorded in the pipe rolls, divided into eleven identifiable categories of royal income[1] and presented in terms of actual cash raised (Table 4) and percentage totals of the entire year's cash revenue which those sums constitute (Table 5). 'Farm' refers to payments made against the county farm, and includes payments made against increments where imposed. These can be viewed alongside 'Demesne' receipts, which largely relate to payments made against farms of *terrae datae* lands that reappear in the main body of the roll, to indicate exploitation of the royal demesne. It is immediately obvious from Table 4 that this source of revenue played a fundamental role in state finance, providing in the region of £8,000 or 75 per cent of Exchequer cash at Richard's accession. Equally clear is the importance of the county farm to these figures at the end of Henry II's reign, totalling £5,984 in 1188 and £5,056 in 1189. However, the cash yield dropped dramatically in 1190 and continued to decline until 1193, when the county farm payment was roughly one third of what it was in 1189. This erosion of the fiscal base can be partly explained by the addition of credit revenue – for example, in 1193, £2,000 was expended by sheriffs on behalf of the crown and was offset against their payments towards the county farms. But for the real reason for this decline though we must look at the level of *terrae datae* created by Richard at the start of his reign.

1. Barratt, 'Revenue', 846–51. See also Mitchell, *Studies in Taxation*, pp. 1–3.

Table 4. *Breakdown of Exchequer Cash Revenue: Actual Cash Totals (county totals, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Farm	Demesne	Judicial	Eyre	Feudal	Debt	Scurage	Tallage	Forest	Jewish	Misc.	Total
1188	5,984	2,732	856	1,899	933	3	76	23	901	2	204	13,613
1189	5,056	3,194	352	683	492	19	98	2	118	5	66	10,083
1190	3,210	958	8,243	258	6,790	30	494	275	708	743	2,066	23,775
1191	2,296	955	598	562	3,032	4	119	0	257	133	176	8,131
1192	2,952	1,479	468	245	1,950	42	67	0	67	416	236	7,921
1193	1,587	1,236	279	458	1,244	29	13	0	17	152	497	5,513
1194	3,471	1,649	1,713	303	4,593	165	2,092	723	174	142	2,963	17,988
1195	4,162	2,020	2,751	1,031	5,598	103	469	783	69	267	1,259	18,510
1196	4,346	2,392	2,292	467	2,530	5	1,852	1,622	22	130	1,416	17,074
1197	4,772	3,488	1,412	232	1,583	921	818	1,287	22	151	927	15,615
1198	4,407	3,391	1,507	840	5,980	422	623	2,486	748	309	601	21,312

Table 5. *Breakdown of Exchequer Cash Revenue: Percentage of Totals (county totals, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Farm	Demesne	Judicial	Eyre	Feudal	Debt	Scutage	Tallage	Forest	Jewish	Misc.	Total
1188	44.0	20.1	6.3	13.9	6.9	0.0	0.6	0.2	6.6	0.0	1.5	100.0
1189	50.1	31.7	3.5	6.8	4.9	0.2	1.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.7	100.0
1190	13.5	4.0	34.7	1.1	28.6	0.1	2.1	1.2	3.0	3.1	8.7	100.0
1191	28.2	11.7	7.4	6.9	37.3	0.0	1.5	0.0	3.2	1.6	2.2	100.0
1192	37.3	18.7	5.9	3.1	24.6	0.5	0.8	0.0	0.8	5.3	3.0	100.0
1193	28.8	22.4	5.1	8.3	22.6	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.3	2.8	9.0	100.0
1194	19.3	9.2	9.5	1.7	25.5	0.9	11.6	4.0	1.0	0.8	16.5	100.0
1195	22.5	10.9	14.9	5.6	30.2	0.6	2.5	4.2	0.4	1.4	6.8	100.0
1196	25.5	14.0	13.4	2.7	14.8	0.0	10.8	9.5	0.1	0.8	8.3	100.0
1197	30.6	22.3	9.0	1.5	10.1	5.9	5.2	8.2	0.1	1.0	5.9	100.0
1198	20.7	15.9	7.1	3.9	28.1	2.0	2.9	11.7	3.5	1.4	2.8	100.0

One of the chief beneficiaries was John who, as we have already seen, received the revenues of six established counties and effectively a seventh with the honour of Lancaster. The loss of these farms clearly affected Exchequer receipts, and the sharp increase in revenue after 1194 when these counties were confiscated from John is testimony to this fact.

The impact of *terrae datae* on the county farm payment is so important in the context of state finance that it requires closer attention. Tables 6 and 7 present the results of a series of calculations surrounding the 'nominal' level of the county farm, that is the fixed values of the county farms recorded in the pipe rolls after 1197 against which the sheriffs were required to make their account (column 1); revenue offset against these totals (columns 2 and 3); deductions allowed to the sheriff on account of *terrae datae* and fixed alms (columns 4 and 5 respectively); and the overall total lost (column 6). From these components it is possible to analyse the real value of the county farms by deducting the alienated total from the nominal total (columns 7 and 8). It is also possible to assess the level of alienated land that was brought back under Exchequer control. These are the 'Demesne' payments described earlier (column 9). By adding this reclaimed income to the real total produced in column 9 we arrive at a 'potential real total' (columns 10 and 11). Table 6 only gives data for those counties that are recorded on the pipe roll, whereas Table 7 treats those lands handed to John as *terrae datae* and therefore adds their normal value to the 'nominal total' to produce a 'potential total' in column 1.

The starting point of the comparative survey is the 1130 pipe roll, the only surviving set of royal accounts before the reign of Henry II. As no nominal county farm totals are recorded in the pipe roll, it has been assumed that the arithmetical calculations for each county are correct (i.e. no scribal errors), and the combination of all elements recorded in the pipe roll – cash and credit, alienated sums, surpluses brought forward and final balances – equals the original total.[1] It is difficult to compare accurately the 1130 farms with those for Henry II and Richard I, as the county groups were different under Henry I and the roll is incomplete. Nevertheless, it is immediately clear that the revenue yield in 1130 was very high. Judith Green has examined the state of the royal demesne on the basis of the 1130 pipe roll, and attributes the high yield from the county farm to the impact of 'special measures' introduced in the 1129–30 financial year, where two experienced administrators, Aubrey de Vere and Richard Basset, held eleven shrievalities between them in an attempt to clear a growing backlog of debt in these counties.[2] Green suggests that the virtual lack of *terrae datae* was a sign of recent re-evaluation in the set levels of the county farms, perhaps as late as 1126,

1. A paper on this subject was presented by N. Barratt at the Harlaxton Symposium in July 1997.
2. J. Green, *The Government of England under Henry I* (Cambridge, 1986) pp. 65–6.

Table 6. *Analysis of County Farm Revenue (county totals, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Col. 1 Nominal total	Col. 2 Revenue total	Col. 3 % of nominal total	Col. 4 *Terrae datae*	Col. 5 Alms	Col. 6 Total lost	Col. 7 Real total	Col. 8 % of nominal total	Col. 9 Regained *Terrae datae*	Col. 10 Potential real total	Col. 11 % of nominal total
1130	8,347	6,029	72.2	147	236	384	7,963	95.4	0	7,963	95.4
1188	11,080	6,951	62.7	3,997	471	4,468	6,612	59.7	820	7,432	67.1
1189	10,662	5,556	52.1	4,043	516	4,559	6,103	57.2	940	7,043	66.1
1190	9,024	4,146	45.9	4,530	327	4,857	4,167	46.2	1,201	5,368	59.5
1191	8,777	3,392	38.6	4,630	319	4,949	3,828	43.6	940	4,768	54.3
1192	8,858	3,548	40.1	4,688	310	4,997	3,861	43.6	867	4,728	53.4
1193	8,812	3,497	39.7	4,754	343	5,098	3,714	42.2	898	4,612	52.3
1194	10,018	3,928	39.2	5,277	337	5,613	4,404	44.0	1,373	5,778	57.7
1195	10,894	4,531	41.6	5,885	362	5,802	5,092	46.7	1,998	7,090	65.1
1196	10,894	4,218	38.7	5,829	375	6,204	4,690	43.1	1,909	6,599	60.6
1197	10,894	4,105	37.7	5,904	376	6,280	4,614	42.4	1,097	5,711	52.4
1198	10,894	3,958	36.3	6,240	376	6,616	4,278	39.3	1,316	5,594	51.3
1199	10,894	3,546	32.5	6,322	363	6,686	4,208	38.6	1,491	5,699	52.3
1200	10,894	3,661	33.6	6,459	364	6,823	4,071	37.4	1,353	5,424	49.8

Farms of counties handed to John are NOT included in the Nominal Total.

Table 7. *Analysis of County Farm Revenue (county totals, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Col. 1 Potential total	Col. 2 Revenue total	Col. 3 % of nominal total	Col. 4 *Terrae datae*	Col. 5 Alms	Col. 6 Total lost	Col. 7 Real total	Col. 8 % of nominal total	Col. 9 Regained *Terrae datae*	Col. 10 Potential real total	Col. 11 % of nominal total
1130	8,347	6,029	72.2	147	236	384	7,963	95.4	0	7,963	95.4
1188	11,080	6,951	62.7	3,997	471	4,468	6,612	59.7	820	7,432	67.1
1189	11,080	5,556	50.1	4,461	516	4,977	6,103	55.1	940	7,043	63.6
1190	10,707	4,146	38.7	6,213	327	6,540	4,167	38.9	1,201	5,368	50.1
1191	10,710	3,392	31.7	6,563	319	6,882	3,828	35.7	940	4,768	44.5
1192	10,792	3,548	32.9	6,621	310	6,931	3,861	35.8	867	4,729	43.8
1193	10,746	3,497	32.5	6,748	343	7,091	3,655	34.0	898	4,552	42.4
1194	10,028	3,928	39.2	5,287	337	5,624	4,404	43.9	1,373	5,778	57.6
1195	10,904	4,531	41.6	5,895	362	6,257	4,647	42.6	1,998	6,645	60.9
1196	10,904	4,218	38.7	5,839	375	6,214	4,690	43.0	1,909	6,599	60.5
1197	10,904	4,105	37.6	5,914	376	6,290	4,614	42.3	1,097	5,711	52.4
1198	10,904	3,958	36.3	6,250	376	6,626	4,278	39.2	1,316	5,594	51.3
1199	10,904	3,546	32.5	6,332	363	6,695	4,209	38.6	1,491	5,700	52.3
1200	10,904	3,661	33.6	6,469	364	6,833	4,071	37.3	1,353	5,424	49.7

Farms of counties handed to John ARE included in the Nominal Total.

intended to correct the massive erosion of the royal demesne that had already occurred since the Domesday survey of 1086.[1]

It is clear from the early pipe rolls of Henry II's reign that the civil war during Stephen's reign had dramatically reduced the real value of the county farms. Indeed, Gerald of Wales suggests that 'so much land had been granted from the royal demesne that the returns to the English Treasury amounted to barely £8,000 a year'.[2] Pipe roll evidence suggests that this estimate is perhaps too high, as revenue reaching the crown was in the region of £5,000, but the 'real value' of the county farms between 1155 and 1157 was about 55 per cent of the nominal total.[3] One of Henry II's first tasks was therefore the restoration of the royal demesne to its full state.[4] The St. Albans chronicler records that 'all lands throughout Britain which should be identified as having formed part of the demesne of his predecessors as kings of England should be surrendered without quibble, to remain for the future in his demesne and that of his successors',[5] but in practice previous grants could be confirmed or renewed.[6] Nevertheless Henry II not only arrested the process of alienation, but also clawed back some land so that the 'real value' of the county farms was 60 per cent of the nominal total by the end of his reign.

After over thirty years of careful husbandry of demesne revenue, Richard appears to have undone his father's work virtually overnight. By 1190, the real total had dropped to 46 per cent, and continued to fall gradually, standing at only 39 per cent of the nominal total by the end of the reign. If the counties granted to John are treated as *terrae datae* then the picture between 1190 and 1193 is even worse; the real value in 1190 becomes 39 per cent, dropping to only 34 per cent by 1193. Instrumental in this process was the removal of royal manors from the county farm. For example, the 'real value' of the county farms of Buckinghamshire/Bedfordshire was reduced by 21 per cent, Berkshire by 36 per cent, Herefordshire by 26 per cent, Norfolk/Suffolk by 29 per cent, Worcestershire by 17 per cent and Yorkshire by 19 per cent, and the nominal value of two farms, Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire and London/Middlesex, were also reduced. It is true that some of these alienated lands reappeared with separate farms in the main body of the roll, such as Wirksworth in Nottinghamshire/Derbyshire, but this was not always the case. Even if these lands are added back to the 'real value' of the county farm, the 'potential' total still shows a steady decline from 67 per

1. J. Green, *The Government of England under Henry I*, p. 64
2. J. S. Brewer, J. F. Dimock and G. F. Warner, *Giraldus Cambrensis, Opera* (Rolls Series, 1861–91) 8 vols, VIII , p. 316.
3. The early pipe rolls are difficult to assess as many accounts were not heard, and those that were audited are subject to scribal and arithmetical error. Hence I quote, the average for the first three years of Henry II's reign is given here to give an impression of the overall picture. I discussed this fully in my paper at Harlaxton 1997.
4. W. L. Warren, *Henry II* (London 1973), p. 61
5. H. T. Riley (ed.), *Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani* (Rolls Series, 1867) I, p. 123.
6. Warren, *Henry II*, p. 61–2.

Table 8. *Analysis of Increments Above the County Farm (county totals, pipe rolls only)*

Year	Old increments	Yield ratio	New increments	Yield ratio	Debts b/fwd	Yield ratio
1188	163	100%				
1189	163	100%				
1190	163	100%				
1191	163	100%				
1192	163	100%				
1193	150	100%				
1194	163	88%	357	82%		
1195	163	100%	677	72%	247	8%
1196	163	100%	727	81%	411	27%
1197	167	70%	727	64%	430	31%
1198	166	95%	580	80%	640	34%
1199	166	90%	680	59%	508	10%
1200	166	97%	547	50%	626	22%

Yield ratio: produced by dividing amount demanded by amount paid.
Debts b/fwd: produced by adding together all uncollected sums from the previous year.

cent in 1188 to 51 per cent in 1198. An important consequence was a corresponding decline in the revenue yield, dropping from 63 per cent of the nominal total in 1188 to only 36 per cent by the end of the reign.

There was clear concern about the falling revenue yield from this source. We have already seen one attempt to boost revenue from land in Table 1, when the county escheats were administered by separate accountants. Table 8 provides details of a second experimental measure. Increments above the county farm were introduced in nine new counties in 1194, in addition to those already established between 1157 and 1167 in four other counties or county groups Norfolk/Suffolk, Bedfordshire/ Buckinghamshire, Warwickshire/Leicestershire and Worcestershire. Indeed, the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk was required to pay a new increment on top of the traditional one, and sheriffs of three other counties offered fines so that they could hold their counties at the old rates. The success of the scheme is shown by the 'yield ratio' columns, produced by dividing the amount actually paid by the amount originally demanded. Prior to 1194, all increments were paid in full, hence the yield ratio of 100 per cent . When the new increments were introduced they generated a far lower yield ratio, and arrears started to accumulate. These debts were paid off at an even slower rate, as the yield ratio suggests, and by John's reign the strains of the experiment were starting to tell. Not only were the traditional increments no longer paid in full, but several new increments were either abolished or reduced, and arrears continued to amass. Indeed, by 1214 increments had been abandoned throughout the country as part of the package of concessions granted to the

Northern barons in 1213.[1] It is with this background in mind that we should view the attempt to overhaul the system in 1206 by means of the appointment of custodial sheriffs who were to collect 'profit' above the fixed county farms,[2] which in financial terms at least were largely successful.

Richard's reign was therefore a vital period for English state finance, and was in apparent contrast to the developments of his Capetian rival. Contemporary chroniclers were of the general opinion that Henry II was richer than Capetians,[3] and Baldwin has attempted to substantiate this claim in his review of the career of Philip Augustus. He suggests that the Capetian royal demesne stood at 20,178 li.par. or £7,365 in 1179.[4] The potential farm income of Normandy in 1180 was 12,488 li.par. or £4,451, which amounts to 65 per cent of the Capetian figure,[5] and to this can be added £11,016 from the English county farms. Henry II was therefore able to rely on £15,467 in 1180 compared with £7,365 for Philip Augustus, although by this date £4,462 from England had been permanently deducted. The position in England remained virtually constant until 1190, after which date Richard severely depleted the royal demesne component in the county farms. In contrast the Capetian royal demesne had expanded by 22 per cent to 24,697 li.par. or £8,982 by 1190, and continued to increase at a greater rate between 1190 and 1203, reaching an impressive total of 34,719 li.par. or £12,572, on the eve of the Norman campaign.[6] This was largely due to territorial gain, an opportunity that was not readily available to Richard given England's fixed frontiers.

Moss has recently argued that Richard's reign saw a reconstruction of Norman finances, based on the revenue yield of the 1195 and 1198 pipe rolls, but these reforms should perhaps be viewed as a short-term fix, comparable with Richard's attempts to raise large sums of disposable cash from England. As we have seen, English resources were increasingly being called upon to fund the dynastic wars, and by 1202–3 revenue from Normandy was in decline and cash was frequently shipped from England to the Norman treasuries.[7] Indeed, by this date the nominal farms of the bailiwicks were insufficient to cover the garrison payments required to man fully the duchy's defences against Capetian attack, a

1. PR 16 John, p. 146 the sheriff of Lincolnshire is not called to account for the arrears of the previous year's increment – 'set non debet summoneri quia R. crementa illa perdonavit per totam Angliam.'

2. B Harriss, 'King John and the Sheriffs' Farms', *ante,* lxxix (1964) 532–42.

3. Warren, *Henry II*, p. 273 where he quotes Gerald of Wales: 'One may marvel that King Henry and his sons nevertheless abounded in wealth, despite their many wars'. The low level of French demesne income is recorded by Philip Augustus's chronicler; see V. D. Moss, 'Normandy and England in 1180: The Pipe Roll Evidence', in D. Bates and A. Curry (ed.), *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages* (London, 1994), p.195 for details.

4. Baldwin, *Government*, p. 54

5. Moss, 'Normandy and England in 1180', p. 195.

6. Ibid, p. 99

7. Stapleton *MRSN* ii pp. 309–10; for discussion see Gillingham *Richard the Lionheart*, pp. 262–4.

direct legacy of Richard's policy of castle building.[1] Baldwin therefore suggests that it was Philip Augustus's reconstruction of Capetian finance between 1190 and 1203 that was ultimately decisive in the struggle,[2] and in terms of demesne revenue this would certainly appear to be in stark contrast to Richard's destructive measures.[3]

A consequence of these dramatic developments was that after 1194 Richard increasingly exploited a range of largely incidental sources of revenue in the counties to compensate for the loss of landed revenue. In the light of the revolutionary pressures that developed in John's reign, the following areas in Tables 4 and 5 take on added significance. 'Judicial' covers voluntary payments to the crown to secure justice in the king's courts, mainly through the purchase of writs, and can be viewed as 'selling' justice. Also included are fines made for the receipt of royal patronage – the purchase of office, the confirmation of existing charters and the securing of new grants. The 'Judicial' category excludes fines relating to feudal incidents such as relief, marriage and wardship, which are dealt with separately in the 'Feudal' column. An important contributor to the 'Miscellaneous' column is punitive fines *pro benevolentia* or *pro gratia Regis*, imposed arbitrarily by the crown and cynically developed under John into a financial straightjacket intended to control the 'loyalty' of the barons.

It is clear that the exploitation of these sources was crucial to the financial preparation for Richard's crusade. 'Judicial' revenue provided a massive £8,243, or 35 per cent of all cash revenue in 1190, a sum twice the size of John's largest yield from this source.[4] Another major contributor was 'Feudal' revenue, producing £6,790 or 29 per cent. Again, John was able to better this total only once, at the height of his excesses in 1211.[5] 'Miscellaneous' sources added a further £2,066 to the crown's coffers. However, the yield of these sources fell away between 1191 and 1193, demonstrating that the 1190 levels were a one-off to fund the crusade. Nevertheless, 1194 remains a clear turning point. All these sources rose dramatically again after Richard's return, and the levels established in 1194 were sustained until the end of the reign. In particular, the feudal relationships between the king and his barons were exploited, with large sums offered and collected for relief, the right to marry and the control of wardship. Likewise there was an increase in the levy of both scutage, a 'tax' on the military obligations of the king's tenants in chief, and tallage, and the tax burden was increased still further in 1198 with the imposition

1. Sir F. M. Powicke, *The Loss of Normandy and its Consequences*, 2nd edn (Manchester, 1961), p. 233.

2. Baldwin, *Government*, pp. 174–5. See also D. Bates, 'The Rise and Fall of Normandy c. 911–1204', in D. Bates and A. Curry (ed.), *England and Normandy in the Middle Ages*, p. 34.

3. For a full discussion of the comparative revenues of John and Philip Augustus, see Barratt, 'John and Philip Augustus' pp. 75–99.

4. John raised £4,384 in 1201. Barratt, 'Revenue', 847.

5. Ibid.

of a carucage. All of these areas of revenue generation were specifically attacked by the protesters in 1215 and are reflected in various sections of Magna Carta which regulated malpractice and were intended to prevent future abuse.

Besides the carucage, there were also signs of activity in 1198 in other areas that had been previously overlooked. 'Eyre' revenue from general eyres and judicial circuits had contributed £1,031 in 1195 and a further £840 in 1198, foreshadowing the increase in frequency under John and reminiscent of the eyres of Henry II that attracted great criticism.[1] Similarly, income from the 'Forest' reached significant proportions in the same year for the first time since 1190, and payments against the 'Debts' of individuals that had been amalgamated into a single source, regardless of the original cause, began to make an impact from 1197 onwards. These developments at the end of Richard's reign were continued and ultimately over-exploited under John as he attempted to fill the vacuum left by the decline of revenue from the royal demesne, and maintain overall annual revenue at a level comparable with the last years of Richard's reign.

Previous surveys of John's revenue have shown that there were inflationary pressures at work during the last few decades of the twelfth century.[2] We can now add the revenue totals from Richard's reign into this sequence to obtain a wider picture. The calculations used to provide inflation data, price indexes and real income are outlined in summary form in Table 9,[3] and figures for real income are provided in Tables 10.1 and 10.2. 1189 has been taken as the base year for the beginning of Richard's reign, partly because the 1190 total is abnormally large for reasons already explained, and also because the 1189 figure is virtually identical to the average annual total for the first half of the reign. The figures for Richard's reign are presented alongside data from key periods from John's reign to provide suitable material for comparison – before the loss of Normandy in 1204, on the eve of the Interdict in 1207, at the height of John's exploitation in 1211, and in the aftermath of Magna Carta in 1215. However, a cautionary note needs to be sounded about these figures. They are intended to provide 'rough and ready' trend data that continue earlier work for the reign of King John, and therefore no account is taken of when the real impact of inflation occurred. Paul Latimer's recent work suggests that the sharpest period of inflation probably took place between 1200 and 1206, with a slower rise after 1207.

1. Warren, *Henry II*, p. 295.

2. Barratt, 'Revenue', 851–5; J. Bolton, 'The English Economy in the early Thirteenth Century' in S. D. Church (ed.), *King John: New Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 41–73; P. Latimer, 'Early Thirteenth Century Prices' in S. D. Church (ed.), *King John: New Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 41–73; J. Bolton, 'Inflation, Economics and Politics' in P. Coss and S. D. Lloyd (eds), Thirteenth Century England IV (Woodbridge, 1992) pp. 1–14; and P. D. A. Harvery 'The English Inflation' in *Past and Present*, lxi (1973), 3–30.

3. Barratt, 'Revenue', 851–4.

Table 9. *Summary of inflation data 1130–1220 (county totals, pipe rolls only)*

1 (a). Average Annual Price Index (Base Year 1189)

Year	1130	1180	1190	1200	1210	1220
Price Index	97	100	100	130	175	205

Average Annual Rate of Increase (Base Year 1189)

Range	1180–1190	1190–1200	1200–1210	1210–1220
Rate	0.0	3.0	4.5	3.0

1 (b). Average Annual Price Index (Base Year 1200)

Year	1130	1180	1190	1200	1210	1220
Price Index	75	77	77	100	135	158

Average Annual Rate of Increase (Base Year 1200)

Range	1180–1190	1190–1200	1200–1210	1210–1220
Rate	0.0	2.3	3.5	2.3

1 (c). Average Annual Price Index (Base Year 1130)

Year	1130	1180	1190	1200	1210	1220
Price Index	100	103	103	134	181	212

Average Annual Rate of Increase (Base Year 1130)

Range	1180–1190	1190–1200	1200–1210	1210–1220
Rate	0.0	3.1	4.7	3.1

2. Average Annual Inflation Rate

Range	1180–1190	1190–1200	1200–1210	1210–1220
Rate	0.0	2.7	3.0	1.6

Average annual inflation rate calculated according to equation $A(1+i)^x = B$, where A = first index, B = second index, x = number of years in sequence and i = rate of inflation.

This would increase the financial pressures on John in the years running up to the loss of Normandy, and thus exaggerate the trends outlined below[1].

It is clear that during the course of his reign, Richard was forced to exert a far greater pressure in actual terms in order to raise the level of real income significantly. For example, by the end of the reign revenue recorded in the pipe rolls was 70 per cent larger than it had been in 1189, but this sum was only able to secure 37 per cent more goods. Indeed, the recent calculations by Latimer show that the prices of certain goods, most noticeably foodstuffs, were increasing at a greater rate than the figures in Table 9 perhaps allow for, and yet military wages were virtually constant between the reign of Henry II and the beginning of John's reign.[2] In the absence of detailed data for commodities that the crown actually purchased, it is difficult to assess whether the totals for real income might be even lower. Nevertheless, whether we use a base year of

1. Latimer, 'Early Thirteenth Century Prices', pp. 41–73
2. Ibid.

Table 10. *Inflation Trends 1130–1211*

10.1 *Base Year 1189 (Pipe Roll Totals, Cash and Credit)*					**10.2** *Base Year 1200 (Pipe Roll Totals, Cash and Credit)*				
Year	Revenue total	Revenue index	Price index	Real index	Year	Revenue total	Revenue index	Price index	Real index
1188	21,233	142	100	142	1188	21,233	90	77	117
1189	14,978	100	100	100	1189	14,978	64	77	83
1190	31,089	208	100	208	1190	31,089	132	77	172
1191	12,418	83	103	80	1191	12,418	53	79	67
1192	9,857	66	106	62	1192	9,857	42	82	51
1193	10,506	70	109	64	1193	10,506	45	84	53
1194	25,292	169	112	151	1194	25,292	108	86	125
1195	25,082	167	115	146	1195	25,082	107	89	121
1196	28,323	189	118	160	1196	28,323	121	91	133
1197	20,775	139	121	115	1197	20,775	88	93	95
1198	25,405	170	124	137	1198	25,405	108	95	113
1199	22,183	148	127	117	1199	22,183	94	98	97
1200	23,492	157	130	121	1200	23,492	100	100	100
1201	23,661	158	135	117	1201	23,661	101	104	97
1202	23,238	155	139	112	1202	23,238	99	107	92
1203	25,628	171	144	119	1203	25,628	109	111	99
1204	27,831	186	148	126	1204	27,831	118	114	104
1207	28,910	193	162	119	1207	28,910	123	125	99
1211	83,291	556	178	312	1211	83,291	355	137	258
1215	18,463	123	190	65	1215	18,463	79	147	54

1189 or 1200 it is clear that Richard enjoyed a definite advantage over his brother in real terms after 1194.

These new data presented go a long way in explaining some of the problems facing John in the latter part of his reign. Much of John's bad press originated from comparisons with his predecessor, a warrior king famous for his exploits in the Third Crusade and his military and diplomatic superiority over Philip Augustus, and this contrast in fortune between the sons of Henry II is usually painted by chroniclers writing after the dramatic period that saw Normandy, Anjou and Poitou fall to Philip.[1] Yet it is clear from the new data contained in this paper that John's early years in England saw nothing more than a continuation of Richard's policies. When John succeeded to the throne, Philip Augustus was committed to expanding his 'ordinary' revenue from the royal demesne at a time when the English equivalent had been severely depleted. Moss has suggested that a similar erosion of the fiscal base had already occured in Normandy, and that the potential for raising revenue, based on the incomplete accounts from 1202–3, was much reduced in

1. Carpenter, 'Ralph of Coggeshall', 1210–30; compare with the approach of Gillingham, *Coeur de Lion*, pp. 114 and 195–9.

comparison to 1195 and 1198.[1] Furthermore John was faced with relentless inflation which continued to place strain on an economy that had seen large sums of cash disappear to the continent to pay for Richard's ransom. Yet the fiscal device employed to raise this cash – extraordinary taxation – was never fully exploited under Richard to fund the continuing war against Philip Augustus. It took the loss of Normandy in 1204 to forge links between extraordinary taxation and dynastic ends.[2]

In effect, no one territory in the Angevin Empire was financially geared to support the others, as the enormous strain placed on English resources after 1204 demonstrates. The gap between the Capetians and the Angevins had narrowed to such an extent that finance no longer played a pivotal role. The cohesion of the Angevin Empire therefore depended on the political, diplomatic and military prowess of its ruler, and John's deficiencies in these areas meant that the Angevin Empire ultimately foundered. And was John entirely to blame in this respect? He was never given any real administrative experience unlike his brother, who governed Aquitaine in his mother's name and built up a body of reliable men. Until his accession, John was given none of the Angevin provinces to control. Henry II suggested that he should follow Richard as ruler in Aquitaine, but instead he received only the lordship of Ireland, a province on the edge of the 'empire', and under Richard a few counties in England that amounted to an over-mighty earldom, and the title 'Count of Mortain'. It was never Henry II's intention that the 'empire' should remain as an entire unit, and Richard's failure to clarify his own intentions regarding the inheritance created a succession dispute on his death[3]. Blame for the loss of the 'Angevin empire' therefore lies as much with the man who devoted his life to shaping and preserving it as the one who ultimately threw it away.

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1. V. D. Moss, 'The Norman Exchequer Rolls of King John', in S. D. Church (ed.), *King John: New Interpretations* (Woodbridge, 1999), pp. 101–16.

2. The Seventh of 1203, the merchants' Fifteenth in 1204 and the Thirteenth of 1207 were all linked to plans to defend or regain the Angevein lands on the continent.

3. For a summary of the dynastic affairs of the Angevin Empire under Henry II see Gillingham, *Coeur de Lion,* pp. 34–8, and Warren, *Henry II*, pp. 230.